VZCZCXRO4213 PP RUEHLA RUEHRN DE RUEHMD #0313 0731650 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 131650Z MAR 08 FM AMEMBASSY MADRID TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4481 INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1479 RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI PRIORITY 0031 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1037 RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0030 RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 0120 RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 0004 RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 3363 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0878 RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME PRIORITY 0005 RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0078 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0421

CONFIDENTIAL MADRID 000313

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AF/C FOR MARLAINA CASEY L/LEI FOR BUCHHOLZ L-AN FOR ONA HAHS KIGALI FOR KAMINSKI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2018

TAGS: PREL PHUM SP

SUBJECT: RWANDAN INDICTMENTS UPDATE

REF: A. SAMSON-CASEY E-MAIL 12 MARCH AND PREVIOUS

¶B. MADRID 201

¶C. KIGALI 107

¶D. MADRID 007

¶E. MADRID 312

Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

- 11. (C) Post urges extreme caution in allowing Rwandan military personnel indicted by the Spanish judiciary to travel to the U.S. for government-sponsored training. We cannot predict how the Spanish judiciary or government may respond should it become known that an individual wanted in connection with the torture and murder of four Spanish citizens is attending a U.S. military conference at USG expense.
- 12. (C) Per ref. B, post has made inquiries regarding the likelihood and timing of a Spanish request for Interpol red notices for the 40 individuals indicted by Spanish judge Fernando Andreu on February 6. An MFA contact said February 22 that he understood a request for Interpol red notices would be forthcoming. However, these inquiries were solely in the context of the possible impact on the Rwandan military attache currently accredited in the United States and did not contemplate active mil-mil cooperation with indicted individuals. Of course, if there is a compelling reason for allowing indicted Rwandan military personnel to the travel to the U.S., we could try to explain that to the Spanish and ask their forbearance.
- 13. (C) Post cannot evaluate the validity of the case and defers to the analysis by Embassy Kigali (ref. C). Spanish MFA contacts have said privately that this is an example of Spanish judges using their judicial independence to pursue a political agenda, similar to previous indictments of Augusto Pinochet and Donald Rumsfeld. However, because specific individuals are indicted in connection with the deaths of Spanish citizens, we should expect that the Spanish government will proceed diligently should the judiciary seek an extradition. It is highly probable that such a controversial subject would land in the media.
- 14. (C) LEGATT confirmed that a bilateral extradition could

take over a year to complete. However, the Spanish judiciary could, if so inclined, process and deliver a provisional arrest request in keeping with the U.S.-Spain MLAT in the span of a day. While such a request might not compel an arrest inside the U.S., the genie would be out of the bottle, so to speak. USG failure to comply with such a request could have serious public relations implications for the U.S. in Spain, if not elsewhere.

15. (C) We have one other, very specific concern. Post is currently placing maximum pressure on the GOS to approve the U.S. extradition request for the notorious Syrian arms dealer Monzer Al-Kassar (ref D,E). A dust-up with Spain over the extradition of someone accused of genocide and complicity in the deaths of Spanish citizens would only make it more difficult for the Spanish government to approve Al-Kassar's extradition.

AGUIRRE